A Socio-technical systems analysis of increasing operational efficiency: why human factors solutions developed without reference to the wider context may not work I n the context of civil aviation 'efficiency' is most often, either directly or indirectly, related to cost and the term 'human factors' has become synonymous with crew resource management and ergonomics. While it can be argued that the former definition is valid (to an extent), there is a great deal more to the human factors discipline.
All boundaries and divisions created by man are artificial, and subject matter boundaries in the world of aviation operations are both artificial and arbitrary. To impose some structure on describing the role of human factors in improving operational efficiency, this paper is organised using a sociotechnical systems framework, which also reflects the organisation and operation of an airline. It also serves to clarify some of the influences that affect the manner in which an airline operates. The framework used is the five 'M's model (see Harris & Harris, 2004; Harris & Thomas, 2005) .
The Five M's model of sociotechnical systems
The operation of an airliner is not simply concerned with the integration of pilot (huMan) and aircraft (Machine) to perform a flight (or Mission) within the constraints imposed by the physical environment (Medium). This approach must encompass the societal environment (another aspect of the Medium) and take into account the role of the Management which is also central to safety and efficiency.
The (hu)man component encompasses elements falling within the 'traditional' realms of psychology and ergonomics such as the capabilities of the end user, their size and bio-medical requirements. From a flight deck design viewpoint, the (hu)man is the ultimate design forcing function. When (hu)man and machine elements come together they perform a mission and when discussing 'efficiency', it is the efficiency of performing the mission which is usually being referred to. However, designers and engineers must not only work within the boundaries of the technology and the abilities of the users, they must also abide by the rules and norms of society (an aspect of the societal Medium) as encompassed in the performance standards for human-machine systems, e.g. the level of redundancy required (aircraft certification) or minimum standards of user competence (flight crew licensing). Management must work within these rules. The airline Management is the link between the (hu)Man, Machine, Mission and Medium. It performs the integrating role to ensure compliance with operating, licensing and certification requirements, and it promotes safe and efficient operations. These inter-relationships are described in Figure 1 .
The Mission of a commercial airliner is simple: to deliver paying passengers at the greatest possible speed and comfort while simultaneously maintaining the highest possible standards of safety and economy. These contradictory requirements can help define what is characterised as 'efficiency', but therein lies a problem. Regulatory objectives are specifically aimed at enhancing safety. An airline's aims, however, need to balance safety against performance, comfort and economy.
To illustrate how efficiency gains may not be fully realised through the modification of just one individual part in the system, two scenarios relating directly to the design and operation of a modern airliner are examined in the following: increasing efficiency through direct routing (often known colloquially as 'Free Flight'); and increasing efficiency through increased flight deck automation.
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Direct routing
Air Traffic Control oversees an aircraft on every step of its journey. Prior to takeoff, pilots inform ATC of their flight plan and are allocated a take-off slot and advised of their departure routing. Once in the air they are passed from ATC at the airport to en route air traffic controllers to whom they give a full status. This process is repeated as they transition from Air Traffic sector to sector until the aircraft is near its destination, where they are given an arrival routing, a final altitude and position and are allocated a slot and runway for landing. This is an extremely inefficient way of flying from A to B. It is not the most direct route and it does not make best use of other aspects of the Medium, e.g. prevailing winds and optimum altitudes for performance.
Future air traffic management (ATM) practices will require aircraft to navigate in a different manner. This concept, known as Direct Routing, will significantly affect the pilot's role and responsibilities. In Direct Routing, responsibility for many elements of both tactical (minute-tominute) and strategic (route planning) navigation will be delegated to the flight deck (self-assured separation). Aircraft will fly direct routes and manoeuvre freely at their optimum speed and altitude, without consultation with ATC. The role of the ground-based ATM/ATC provider in the free Direct Routing concept becomes one of flow management around strategic pieces of airspace (e.g. entry and exit to such designated air traffic areas) and safety surveillance, rather than one of 'positive' control. By being able to operate in this manner aircraft will spend less time in the air and use less fuel, significantly increasing efficiency. The impetus to move to such a system is also driven by the fact that the current system is inefficient in its use of the airspace available and unless changes are made, it will be impossible to cope with the increasing growth in air traffic. It is expected that air traffic in Europe will double by 2015 (Eurocontrol, 2002) .
However, changes to the physical airspace, either directly or indirectly, require other potentially wide-ranging changes to components of the ATM system. To optimise efficiency gains as a result of changes in the Mission, both ATC and aircraft need to be re-equipped with new navigation and surveillance equipment (Machine); crews need to be trained to use this equipment and associated procedures (huMan) which also involves the procurement of new training devices (Machine), for example computer-based training software and/or additions and upgrades to flight simulators (which will also need regulatory approval -an aspect of the societal Medium). The airline management is responsible for integrating these mission, machine and human aspects and international regulatory agreement is required for the approval of equipment and operation of Direct Routing airspace (another aspect of the societal Medium).
Many human factors specialists are currently working on various individual components. Changes in the airspace to allow free flight cannot be fully exploited if aircraft are not equipped with suitable display technology to allow pilots to manoeuvre to maintain separation from other traffic, avoid weather and undertake other aspects of real-time flight planning. A great deal of work is being undertaken to develop such Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) systems, particularly by NASA at the Ames research centre who have engaged in a great deal of effort in this area (see http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov /ihh/cdti/cdti.html). Work has principally centred on the real-time representation of 4-dimensional traffic information to aid situation awareness and decision-making (e. Johnson et al, 2005) . However, without automated assistance pilots were found to be inefficient at resolving conflicts, (Johnson et al, 2003) , clearly demonstrating that training is also required to complement display design to maximise efficiency. A simple exercise using straight lines to join together all the major cities in Europe demonstrates that the potential gains in the efficient use of airspace will, to an extent, not be as great as initially thought. The skies over Southern Germany will certainly be popular and conflict resolution will be an essential skill in the pilots' armoury! However, while resolving potential conflicts is a central part of the pilots' new tasks, it is not the only one. To derive the maximum potential gains in efficiency through the optimum utilisation of Direct Routing airspace, additional effort will also need to be expended on training and educating pilots in all aspects of aircraft performance, e.g. the effects of altitude and temperature; wind; and conserving energy in both the climb and descent phases. Further increases in automation may help to some extent, but simply continuing to increase the degree of automated assistance will not necessarily increase overall operating efficiency.
Flight deck automation
Just a very brief inspection of accident statistics (e.g. Boeing, 2000) shows that third and fourth 'generation' airliners (e.g. Boeing 757/767; Airbus A300-600; or Boeing 777; Airbus A330) with two crew, highly automated flight decks have an accident rate less than half that of their second 'generation' counterparts (e.g. Boeing 727 or McDonnell-Douglas DC10). Systems such as CAT III autoland have not only contributed to safety, though they have also had the simultaneous effects of increasing ontime arrivals and reducing the number of weather-related diversions, hence dramatically increasing operational efficiency. However, the fallacious argument that safety can be improved by removing the operator from the system, thereby avoiding error, must be avoided. There are three problems with this approach: automated devices are designed and built by human beings (it is just the nature of error changes); such devices are not perfect and have the potential for generating errors themselves; and finally, a highly trained individual who understands the automation is required to monitor and intervene when the automation parameters are exceeded or an unexpected event in the operating environment occurs (see Harris, 2003) . Automation is only partially context aware at the very best.
As an example, a CAT III autoland system cannot cope with a runway incursion. Human intervention is required (see also Bainbridge, 1987 for more 'ironies of automation').
In terms of economy and reliability the autothrottle and autopilot can fly the aircraft more smoothly, accurately and economically than a pilot. They adapt to environmental dis-turbances faster and can fly complex thrust management schedules. As a result, aircraft can be operated more economically under autoflight control and can function more smoothly, producing less 'wear and tear' thereby reducing maintenance costs. Furthermore, the onboard sensors and automation allow for more precise control and navigation, allowing shorter flying times, hence increasing efficiency. In some sections of airspace vertical separations are being reduced to 1,000 feet and in Direct Routing flight areas aircraft are required to self assure in-trail separations. High levels of automation are required to achieve these aims and are also mandatory under national and international rules.
However, despite any apparent operational efficiency gains it has yet to be completely established if automation reduces whole lifecycle costs (e.g. Dekker & Hollnagel, 1999) . The higher costs of operating a highly automated aircraft can stem from many sources. As an example, modern aircraft are equipped with multiple automation modes to endow them with as much flexibility as possible. This has both benefits and drawbacks. Flexibility increases the range of responses available to a pilot in a given situation, but can also overburden pilots during critical periods of high workload. To operate the aircraft efficiently and safely, pilots must now be familiar with all the automation modes available and possess knowledge of how and when to apply them. This places considerable training demands on pilots, hence simultaneously increases costs and the subsequent opportunity for error.
Dekker (2004) further attempts to disabuse the notion that automation reduced labour costs. He points out that automation made some crew redundant (e.g. radio operators, navigators and flight engineers) but the pilots were left to fill the gaps remaining, being required to attain these further competencies to some degree. As a result, automation actually increased the need to invest in human expertise. Dekker & Hollnagel (1999) suggest that procurement of new equipment is often influenced by a trade-off between labour-intensive low-technology systems (with lesser training requirements) and high technology systems, for which it will be expensive to train and retain operators (the civil aviation industry has certainly adopted wholeheartedly the latter approach). Taking an even broader view, the design, development, certification, production and maintenance of highly automated aircraft is undoubtedly far more expensive than that for a simpler machine. Once training costs are also incorporated, the question still remains: taking into account the whole lifecycle of the aircraft, do these costs associated with highly automated aircraft outweigh their operational efficiency gains?
There are two factors with their roots in the societal Medium, however, which severely limit any further efficiency gains in the human element of the socio-technical system of operating a commercial aircraft. Firstly, the operating regulations require a minimum of two qualified flight deck crew (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14; Joint Airworthiness Requirement -Operations [JAR-OPS]). Until these regulations are changed, no matter how highly automated the aircraft is, the airline will still be required to place two highly qualified, highly paid pilots on the flight deck. Automation does not replace human work; it merely changes its nature. Two members of flight crew (as a result of the requirements if the regulatory Medium) will still be required. Significant changes in efficiency could be achieved by operating aircraft with a single pilot (up to 18% of direct operating costs in commuter aircraft are crew-related). There has already been demonstrated the potential to fly safely with a single pilot. The military operate complex onepilot aircraft on a regular basis. Intelligent automation to aid and monitor the pilot has been under development for sometime (e.g. ). Removing one member of flight crew may actually enhance certain aspects of safety. Poor crew communication has been implicated in many accidents. Removing one pilot removes this error mode! However, as has been argued previously, introducing high levels of automation in such an aircraft may not significantly reduce costs. Savings on flight crew may be offset by other factors in design, operation and maintenance.
As a second example of how possible efficiency gains may not be exploited as a result of aspects in the Medium, many departure and arrival air traffic control procedures still cannot take advantage of the automation available in modern aircraft. This is as a result of such factors as the arrangement of the airspace near the airport, air traffic procedures not congruent with the automation and/or a lack of knowledge on the part of Air Traffic Controllers about utilising the capabilities of a modern Flight Management System to best effect. As a result, the flight crew have to almost semi-manually 'fly' the aircraft and most automation is not particularly 'efficient' in these circumstances. Current implementations of flight deck automation have reduced crew workload where it was already low (e.g. in the cruise) but has increased it dramatically where it was already high (e.g. in terminal manoeuvring areas). Wiener (1989) called this 'clumsy' automation. However, this observation notwithstanding, the human pilot will always be needed as automation is never fully context aware.
Conclusions
Significant increases resulting from enhancements in the efficiency of any one component of the system alone for the operation of airliners are unlikely. Operational efficiency can only be marginally enhanced through changes made solely to, for example, the Machine or Medium component. Changes in the structure of airspace (and hence the nature of aircraft operations) which may lead to large potential gains in efficiency can only be exploited if the aircraft (Machine) is equipped to do so and the crew and trained in a complementary fashion.
Perhaps the greatest lesson, though, is that significant changes in efficiency will not be driven by changes in the (hu)Man, Machine or Mission components alone. Revolution is required, not evolution. Ultimately, changes in efficiency are dictated by what the Medium, in the form of society and legislation, will tolerate and these aspects of the Medium are risk averse. Neither human factors, flight operations or aircraft engineering can be considered in isolation from this socio-technical context. Perhaps in the long term the greatest gains in efficiency may be achieved by a better understanding of the nature of legislation and the rule making process (effectively developing a 'science' of regulation), rather than developing more efficient aircraft!
